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The political dynamics of voter retrospection and disaster 
responses 
Olivier Rubin Professor, Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, 
Denmark 
 
Natural hazards not only have socioeconomic ramifications, they also have political 
repercussions. This paper takes stock of the fast-growing area of research linking disasters 
triggered by natural hazards to voting behaviour. It is based on the central tenet of voter 
retrospection: voters place emphasis on past events when making their selection. The study 
uncovers a great disparity in analysis of electoral outcomes in the wake of disasters, part of 
which can be explained by the different methodological choices of authors. However, the 
unpredictability of voting behaviour in the aftermath of disasters also points to the relevance 
of introducing an intermediate variable when elucidating voter movements. This variable 
should capture the prevailing political discourses that surround disasters, as these are likely to 
shape the dynamics of voter retrospection. The paper demonstrates the analytical relevance of 
such political discourses by contrasting political dynamics in Denmark and Sweden following 
the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004.  
 
Keywords: disaster discourses, elections, government responses, political narratives, 
tsunami, voter retrospection,  
 
Introduction 
It is well known that natural hazards can have severe socioeconomic consequences, but their 
considerable political repercussions are less acknowledged. Indeed, natural hazards with 
adverse socioeconomic impacts are often referred to as ‘natural disasters’. Such a term might 
be helpful in categorising different disasters according to their main triggers, yet it inevitably 
also reinforces the misconception that disasters are in some way ‘natural’, and not, as the 
disaster community has emphasised for decades, an epiphenomenon stemming from the 
intersection of natural hazards and vulnerable human-made political and socioeconomic 
systems (Rubin and Dahlberg, 2017). Ideally, ‘disasters triggered by natural hazards’ should 
be the preferred terminology throughout the paper, but the expression is rather cumbersome. 
At times, therefore, this paper uses ‘disasters’ for short.  
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This study engages critically with state-of-the-art research linking disasters triggered by 
natural hazards to retrospective voting behaviour in pluralistic regimes. The underlying 
theoretical maxim for research connecting disasters to voting behaviour is that voters will 
either punish or reward incumbent governments, depending on how they handle the adverse 
consequences of such events. Assuming that they are interested in staying in power, 
incumbent governments will thus have incentives to mitigate the adverse consequences of 
disasters triggered by natural hazards (Sen, 1999, 2009; Boin et al., 2005; Kahn, 2005; Flores 
and Smith, 2013). Or they will be interested in artificially naturalising the harm caused by 
disasters triggered by natural hazards (Chmutina et al., 2017); incumbent governments are 
particularly prone to blaming them on force majeure, nature’s unpredictable wrath or divine 
intervention, in order to avoid blame and political responsibility. 
 
The focus of this paper, therefore, is primarily on the political implications of disasters rather 
than on their causes, meriting, too, political research. This analytical emphasis should not be 
conflated with the view that disasters arise out of nothing to engulf unwitting citizens and 
governments. Rather, it constitutes a choice to try to shed light on the political consequences 
of disasters triggered by natural hazards.  
 
The past decade has witnessed a surge in academic interest in investigating the political 
consequences through the lens of retrospective voting theory, but few studies have hitherto 
cultivated this field of enquiry.1 Interestingly, compiling the many works reveals a disparity 
of electoral outcomes in the wake of disasters. Some scholars argue that such disasters will 
always be to the disadvantage of governments because voters will punish them for the 
adverse consequences of the hazards. Others make the case that governments could benefit 
electorally from disasters provided that voters approve of their disaster mitigation efforts.  
 
Empirical evidence supports both positions. Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier (2016, p. 86) 
summarise the existing literature by claiming that it suggests that incumbent governments are 
penalised by voters for natural hazards beyond their control. Eriksson (2016, p. 130), on the 
contrary, claims that the accumulated evidence of retrospective voting is good news that 
points to retrospection as an accountability mechanism. The ambiguous empirical evidence 
linking disasters and retrospective voting behaviour can be ascribed in part to methodological 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see Rubin (2018). 
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differences and caveats, relating to: the timing of the elections; their competitiveness; how 
causality is established after a disaster; how socioeconomic heterogeneity across regions is 
accounted for: whether studies assess voting gaps or overall election results; and the extent to 
which a broader palette of political responses are included in the analyses.  
 
This paper’s key argument is that the apparent unpredictability of retrospective voting 
behaviour following disasters also highlights the need to introduce an intermediate variable 
when explaining voter movements. That variable should capture the dominant political 
discourses that are prevalent post disaster. These political discourses can affect voting 
behaviour directly, and they can distort the relationships between disaster impacts and 
policies on one side and voting behaviour on the other. Through a most-similar comparative 
evaluation of the political dynamics in Denmark and Sweden after the Indian Ocean tsunami 
on 26 December 2004, the paper demonstrates the relevance of including such an 
intermediate variable.  
 
The study is set out as follows. First, it takes stock of existing state-of-the-art research 
connecting disasters triggered by natural hazards to retrospective voting behaviour. Next, it 
engages critically with this literature, pointing to caveats and methodological choices that 
might contribute to the observed discrepancies in voting behaviour. Finally, it makes the case 
for paying attention to dominant political narratives and symbols when researching the nexus 
between disasters and voting behaviour, and demonstrates the applicability of such an 
approach by contrasting political dynamics in Denmark and Sweden following the 2004 
tsunami. 
 
Disasters and voting  
Essentially, disasters pose a risk to democratic governments because the adverse 
socioeconomic ramifications undermine the electoral support necessary to keep them in 
office after subsequent elections (Mesquita et al., 2003; Morrow et al., 2008). Voters can 
punish governments that do not do their utmost to ease the adverse impacts of disasters, 
which is why government responsiveness in a time of distress is found to be stronger (ceteris 
paribus) in more pluralistic political systems (Sen, 1999, 2009; Boin et al., 2005; Kahn, 
2005; Flores and Smith, 2013).  
 
 4 
This type of research is principally shaped by the theory of retrospective voting (Fiorina, 
1981; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). Retrospective voting theory assumes that individuals place 
emphasis on past events when casting their vote. In the context of disasters, retrospection will 
most often involve an assessment of the nexus between the effects of a natural hazard and 
government responses to them. Blind retrospection predicts that voters will concentrate 
mainly on the impacts of disasters and punish governments at the ballot box for any maladies 
that they experience owing to the hazards (Fiorina, 1981; Achen and Bartels, 2004). Hence, 
voters are assumed to be guided by a high degree of bounded rationality, judging the 
incumbent government solely on whether or not their own situation has deteriorated. 
Mediated retrospection predicts that voters will judge the incumbent government chiefly on 
its policy responses to the disaster (Fiorina, 1981). As such, voters do not base their decision 
on particular outcomes, but rather on the policies implemented. Blind retrospection can only 
lead to one type of voting behaviour given the likely assumption that major disasters have 
negative impacts: voters will punish the incumbent government for the event itself. Mediated 
retrospection, in contrast, can lead to voters penalising the incumbent government or 
rewarding it, depending on the policies introduced.  
 
Several studies have documented that governments lose support after a disaster triggered by a 
natural hazard. Achen and Bartels (2004) evaluated the effect of torrential rains and droughts 
on presidential elections in the United States. They found that voter support for the 
incumbent government decreased by about 1.5 percentage points in constituencies that 
experienced extreme precipitation in the period leading up to the poll. Similarly, Healy and 
Malhotra (2010) assessed the effect of tornado damage on US presidential elections and 
found that it decreased the incumbent party’s share of the vote in the worst-affected counties 
by between one and two percentage points as compared to the national average. Arceneaux 
and Stein (2006) analysed political blame following Tropical Storm Allison in June 2001, 
which caused a 500-year flood that wreaked havoc in Houston, Texas. People who lived in 
neighbourhoods hard hit by the flood were more likely to blame the government for 
inadequate flood preparation policies than Houstonians in less affected and unaffected areas. 
Here, mediated retrospection (appraisal of government policies) was clearly conditioned by 
blind retrospection (the level of destruction owing to the flood).  
 
This finding is very similar to those in a study by Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier (2016) of 
voting behaviour after a flood in the Canadian city of Calgary in June 2013. In this case, the 
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authors contrasted the 15 flooded subdivisions with the 127 subdivisions that were not 
flooded and discovered a substantial and significant vote gap of six percentage points 
between the two. Based on a historical study of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, 
Heersink, Peterson, and Jenkins (2017) found that this event ended up decreasing voter 
support for presidential candidate Herbert Hoover by more than 10 percentage points in 
affected counties, despite an unprecedented level of disaster relief at the time. Beyond the 
US, Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012) documented that voters across 28 states in India 
appeared to punish incumbent government coalitions at the ballot box for extreme changes in 
rainfall. Rainfall just one standard deviation from the optimal level reduced their share of the 
vote by three percentage points. Eriksson (2016) examined Cyclone Gudrun, which hit 
southern parts of Sweden with great force in January 2005. The destruction led to a decline in 
support for the government in affected areas of almost four percentage points at the next 
national poll.  
 
Other studies have shown that disasters triggered by natural hazards lead to an increase in 
government support. While incumbent governments might start out at a disadvantage because 
they can lose support instantly during a disaster (blind retrospection), they can actually end 
up gaining votes by handling the situation effectively (mediated retrospection). Bechtel and 
Hainmueller (2011) scrutinised German voting behaviour after the Elbe flood in August 
2002. The launch of one of the most comprehensive disaster relief programmes in recent 
history led to the incumbent government being rewarded quite substantially: a vote share 
increase of seven percentage points in affected areas as compared to unaffected areas 
(Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). Neugart and Rode (2017) also spotlighted German voting 
behaviour in their study of the electoral implications of the major flooding in Germany in 
May–June 2013. The incumbent federal government implemented a generous disaster policy 
that uniformly matched any decentralised state spending on relief, yet the study could not 
identify a significant electoral impact overall in subsequent federal elections held a few 
months afterwards. However, disaggregating the municipalities into a western part and an 
eastern part revealed an interesting mediated retrospective dynamic: the incumbent 
government received a larger vote share, of two percentage points, in the flooded 
municipalities in the east of the country as compared to those in the west in the elections in 
2013, controlling for other factors. This difference, Neugart and Rode (2017) argued, was 
probably due to the fact that less democratically experienced voters in the east were more 
responsive to the government’s disaster policies.  
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Reeves (2011) analysed the electoral impacts of US presidential disaster declarations and 
found that one can bolster the incumbent president’s vote share by one percentage point in 
affected states as compared to those with no declaration. Velez and Martin’s (2013) study of 
voter movements following Hurricane Sandy in October–November 2012 also suggests that 
voters reward governments for disaster policies. Correcting for socio-political heterogeneity 
across affected and unaffected counties through statistical matching, they estimated that then 
US President Barack Obama’s share of the vote increased by four percentage points in areas 
affected by Sandy. Remmer’s (2014) analysis of voting behaviour in less mature democracies 
across 21 Caribbean islands found that hurricanes could augment chances of re-election by as 
much as 10 percentage points. This rise was closely linked to a proxy for government 
competence in managing the disaster, indicating a high degree of mediated retrospection. The 
aforementioned study by Healy and Malhotra (2010) found that tornado damage might 
actually increase votes for the president’s party provided that the incumbent president issued 
a disaster declaration and released federal funds.  
 
Although this finding was not statistically significant (in part owing to the infrequency of 
disaster declarations), the same authors reached a similar conclusion about major disasters in 
general: the incumbent party received a higher share of votes in US counties in which major 
disasters were followed by relief aid (Healy and Malhotra 2009). Not all studies, however, 
found that mediated retrospection could cancel out the initial drop in voter support. Cole, 
Healy, and Werker (2012), for example, discovered that Indian governments could only 
regain a fraction of what they lost initially from just presiding over a natural hazard event. 
Thus, while voters did reward the incumbent government for the provision of effective and 
swift emergency aid to disaster-affected states, this mediated retrospection effect was 
minuscule as compared to the impact of blind retrospection.  
 
Table 1 summarises the different electoral outcomes of disasters triggered by natural hazards 
according to each study and the dominant theory of retrospection.  
 
Table 1. Classification of studies linking disasters triggered by natural hazards to voter 
movements  
 Blind retrospection dominates Mediated retrospection dominates 
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Increase in support  Healy and Malhotra (2009) 
Healy and Malhotra (2010) 
Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) 
Reeves (2011) 
Velez and Martin (2013) 
Remmer (2014) 
Neugart Rode (2017) 
Decline in support Achen and Bartels (2004) 
Arceneaux and Stein (2006) 
Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012) 
Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier 
(2016)  







The difference in electoral outcomes is apparent from Table 1. Most studies acknowledge that 
the two different types of retrospective dynamics are not mutually exclusive, and that 
retrospective voting behaviour frequently entails blind and mediated dynamics. The studies 
differ, though, in terms of which retrospective dynamic dominates, reflected in the great 
disparities of voting outcomes across the studies. These tend to cut across economic 
development and geography, with the important caveat that most works address electoral 
dynamics in the US and only a few investigate voting behaviour in developing countries.  
 
A related limitation with the academic literature linking disasters to retrospective voting 
behaviour, including the present paper, is that the empirical scope is mostly restricted to 
mature democracies. The field of research draws primarily on data from elections in liberal 
democracies such as the Canada, Germany, India, Sweden, and the US. These countries are 
all characterised as ‘free’ by the independent watchdog organisation, Freedom House (2018). 
Very few have been conducted in nations with authoritarian (not free) or hybrid (partly free) 
regimes, despite the fact that citizens there tend to suffer the most owing to disasters triggered 
by natural hazards: 15 of the 20 most lethal natural hazards in 2017, for example, occurred in 
authoritarian or hybrid regimes (CRED, 2017; Freedom House, 2018).  
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This bias is caused not only by academic ethnocentrism. An obvious methodological hurdle is 
that elections in such countries (to the extent that they are held) cannot be used as an 
unbiased indicator of voting behaviour. Hence, while acknowledging case selection bias, it 
also appears relevant to focus on the overarching methodological caveats of the studies at 
hand as a potential source of the diverse results of voting outcomes.  
 
Main methodological differences and caveats  
This paper has identified six methodological issues that merit further discussion. Some of 
these could very well account for parts of the divergence of electoral outcomes. Others 
pertain more directly to the need for including a broader scope of political strategies in 
retrospective analyses. The six methodological issues relate to:  
 
• the timing of the elections;  
• the competitiveness of the elections;  
• how socioeconomic heterogeneity across regions is accounted for;  
• whether studies assess voting gaps or overall election results;  
• how causality is established post disaster; and  
• the extent to which a broader palette of political responses are included in the 
analyses. 
 
The relevance of the timing of elections  
The first issue relates to the importance of election cycles in retrospective voting behaviour. 
Myopic voters, so the argument goes, will value recent events more than those in the past 
(Kiewet and Rivers, 1984). Achen and Bartels (2004) document that the number of years 
until the next election reduces the electoral impact of disasters. The Indian study by Cole, 
Healy, and Werker (2012) suggests that voters respond to disaster relief only in the year 
preceding an election. Other works suggest a more enduring but diminishing effect of 
retrospection. Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) examine the durability of voter gratitude for 
effective disaster policies by drawing on voting behaviour after the Elbe flood in 2002. 
Electoral gains in affected areas in the 2002 elections (seven per cent) extended to the 2005 
polls (two per cent) before dissipating in 2009. Eriksson (2016) also found that the impact of 
Cyclone Gudrun impacted on voting in Sweden more than 1.5 years later, and that the decline 
 9 
in government support carried over (albeit on a smaller scale) to the elections in 2010 and 
2014. The timing of the election, therefore, is an important additional variable.  
 
The relevance of the competitiveness of elections 
The second issue looks specifically at the level of competition in pluralistic regimes. It is 
known from presidential elections in the US that the level of competition varies substantially 
from state to state, and that political attention centres mostly on a handful of ‘battleground’ 
states. Reeves’ (2011) study of US presidential elections in the period 1981–2004 analysed 
whether or not differences in electoral competitiveness influenced disaster declarations. The 
average margin of victory in the three preceding elections served as a proxy of the extent of 
electoral competiveness. A large margin would thus indicate limited electoral 
competitiveness, whereas a small margin would denote more fierce competition. Reeves 
(2011) found the number of disaster declarations to be twice as high in competitive states 
after controlling for the actual impact of the disaster triggered by a natural hazard.  
 
The importance of electoral competitiveness is also supported by a study by Gasper and 
Reeves (2011), which discovered that governors of highly competitive states asked for more 
federal relief. Interestingly, term-limited governors (who did not face re-election) did not 
exhibit this behaviour. Sainz-Santamaria and Anderson (2013) evaluated the electoral politics 
of disaster preparedness across US counties and concluded that disaster spending peaks in the 
most competitive counties because of their higher electoral returns. Consequently, it appears 
that the level of competition matters for electoral outcomes. Yet, most studies do not control 
for the different levels of competition across constituencies. The political outcomes of 
retrospective voting, it follows, are not just shaped by the ramifications of disasters, but also 
by variations in pre-existing electoral characteristics across constituencies.  
 
Heterogeneity between affected and unaffected areas  
The third issue is related to the socioeconomic heterogeneity of regions. Although disasters 
can be treated as exogenous shocks for analytical purposes, simple comparisons of voting 
behaviour in affected versus unaffected regions are probably flawed owing to inherent 
socioeconomic heterogeneity across regions. While an earthquake might be truly exogenous, 
the local impacts are formed by baseline political and socioeconomic factors. These context-
specific socioeconomic factors produce different trajectories of electoral outcomes from one 
election to the next in the aftermath of a disaster. Merely comparing the electoral 
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consequences of affected regions with unaffected regions without statistical matching (or the 
employment of a similar statistical tool) could lead, therefore, to biased estimates. Hurricane 
Katrina, for instance, which made landfall in Florida and Louisiana, US, in August 2005, 
disproportionately affected regions with certain socioeconomic characteristics (poorer 
African-American neighbourhoods) (Hartman and Squires, 2006). Hence, any differences in 
voting gaps at the subsequent elections are probably influenced not only by the hurricane, but 
also by the baseline socio-economic heterogeneity between affected and unaffected areas. 
 
Some studies do not address this heterogeneity when comparing the voting gap between 
affected and unaffected areas (Achen and Bartels, 2004; Cole, Healy, and Werker, 2012). 
Others apply statistical tools to alleviate the bias caused by this heterogeneity (Velez and 
Martin, 2013; Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier, 2016). Concretely, Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier 
(2016) highlight that socio-political conditions in flooded regions as compared to non-
flooded regions of Calgary were not equivalent. In fact, once they were matched statistically, 
the voting difference between them (noted earlier) became insignificant.  
 
Voting gaps or gains? 
The fourth issue addresses the difference between investigating voting gaps and overall 
electoral gains. The focus often is on voting gaps between affected and unaffected areas 
(Achen and Bartels, 2004; Lazarev et al., 2014; Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier, 2016; Eriksson, 
2016). Such lacunae, however, say little about the overall electoral effect of the disaster, and 
whether a disaster might prove to be an advantage or a disadvantage for a government. In the 
event of a major disaster, it is unlikely that the voting behaviour of the control group 
(unaffected areas) will remain constant. Mediated retrospection dictates that all voters assess 
the government’s disaster policies; not just those affected by the event. Very generous relief 
aid might increase government support in affected areas, but it might lead to less support in 
those unaffected areas that need to pay the bill. While the generous disaster management 
policies in the wake of the 2002 Elbe flood increased support for the incumbent government 
in affected areas, the same policies appear to have cost it three percentage points of support in 
unaffected districts (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). In this particular case, the net voting 
result ended up being of advantage to the incumbent government, but this is by no means a 
guaranteed outcome. Most disasters have consequences that are geographically confined and 
might only affect a small proportion of the population.  
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Assuming or establishing causality? 
The fifth issue relates to causality. Very few studies engage in process tracing. Most rely on 
co-variation by establishing that government disaster policies have been criticised and that 
the incumbent government subsequently lost votes (Velez and Martin, 2013; Eriksson, 2016). 
However, they do not investigate the causal link between an unfavourable public perception 
of government policies and the decline in government support. Thereby, they fail to eliminate 
the possibility of other factors driving the outcome.  
 
The research by Montjoy and Chervenak (2018) illustrates how other factors can counter 
expected retrospective voting dynamics. They analysed the local re-elections in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, after Hurricane Katrina and found that other voting dynamics dominated the 
retrospective effect, leading to the re-election of the incumbent mayor, C. Ray Nagin, amidst 
great destruction and public criticism. Race-based voting as well as prospective voting, 
according to the authors, were key determinants of voting behaviour in the local election in 
2006 (Montjoy and Chervenak, 2018, p. 10).  
 
A related challenge is how to tease out the exogenous effect (the natural hazard) from the 
more endogenous political factors (such as inadequate preventive policies, flawed early 
warning systems, and weak building codes). The extent to which voters react to extremes in 
rainfall (an exogenous effect) vis-à-vis the country’s worn and unmaintained sewerage 
system (an endogenous political factor) is difficult to disentangle using large-N studies only. 
Ideally, therefore, assessments of mediated retrospection should trace causality from a certain 
public perception of disaster policies to an actual electoral outcome. Analyses can use mixed 
methods to flesh out better the causal mechanisms between flawed government policies and 
certain electoral outcomes. Qualitative studies could uncover other potentially relevant 
political variables and strengthen the field of research either as standalone contributions or 
nested in large-N quantitative studies (Lieberman, 2005). This paper will point to one such 
variable that captures the prevailing political discourses.  
 
Suboptimal disaster responses 
The last issue relates to government responses. While retrospective dynamics in a pluralist 
regime surely elicit government responses in the wake of disasters, the added value of such a 
response is an open empirical question. Governments are rarely rewarded electorally for 
proactive policies that prevent disasters. Not only are politicians rarely rewarded electorally 
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for a non-event (the lack of a disaster), but also they need to defend what seem like policy 
inefficiencies over many years in anticipation of a possible disaster in the future. Hence, 
governments are mostly rewarded electorally for reactive reconstruction and management 
policies rather than preventive policies. This leads to perverse political incentives in disaster 
management, where there are few political advantages to implementing preventive measures 
despite obvious humanitarian benefits. Healy and Malhotra (2009) have estimated cost–
benefit ratios that strongly suggest spending on disaster preparedness: one dollar spent could 
avoid seven dollars’ worth of disaster damage in the future.  
 
The ramifications of this adverse political dynamic are exacerbated further by a whole range 
of counterproductive behavioural characteristics in human beings, such as generally 
underestimating low-probability events, having a certain degree of fatalism, and finding it 
unappealing to think about death and destruction (Bucci and Savadori, 2018). In addition, 
disasters might elicit not only disaster policies of the sorts included in most of the studies, but 
also a broader spectrum of political strategies, including blame avoidance, manipulating 
public opinion, scapegoating, and secrecy (Boin et al., 2005; Hood, 2011). This broader 
palette of political responses to disasters triggered by natural hazards points to the relevance 
of paying attention to other political variables, such as one that captures the dominant 
political discourses surrounding the disaster.  
 
The power of disaster discourses  
While the methodological differences and caveats just presented explain some of the 
ambivalence in voter movements following disasters, this paper argues that an omitted 
variable could be a key driver of these divergent results. That voting behaviour appears so 
unpredictable might point to the existence of an important intermediate variable that has not 
received much attention to date in the retrospective voting theory literature. This variable is 
best explained by the public debate that ensued in the wake of Hurricane Harvey, which made 
landfall in Texas in August 2017 with great force, displacing some 30,000 people and leaving 
several hundred thousand people without electricity. Within days, President Donald Trump 
and First Lady Melania Trump travelled to the state to survey the ongoing devastation and to 
bring comfort to the victims. The First Lady boarded Air Force One to travel to Texas 
wearing black pegged trousers, black sunglasses, an olive-green bomber jacket, and five-inch 
Manolo Blahnik stilettos. When re-emerging from Air Force One in Texas she had dressed 
down to white sneakers, a T-shirt, and a black baseball cap. Melania Trump’s attire has 
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nothing to do with the impact of the hurricane and the hardship suffered; nor is it related to 
the actual disaster policies being implemented. However, it mattered tremendously on a 
symbolic level, and her upscale apparel initially attracted much public criticism (The New 
York Times, 2017; The Telegraph, 2017; Vanity Fair, 2017). When it was revealed that she 
had in fact changed into something more practical on the flight, this generated an equal 
amount of public debate and partisan accusations (Fox News, 2017; Los Angeles Times, 
2017). It is evident, therefore, that symbols and narratives also affect voter retrospection, 
distorting the perception of disaster-related damage and policies and resulting in independent 
direct impacts on voting behaviour (see Figure 1).  
 





The direct effect is clear from the example above: how politicians behave post disaster 
matters. They are expected to be a uniter in a time of chaos, convey the nation’s compassion 
to victims, grieve with the surviving relatives, and instil hope and optimism for the future 
(Rubin, 2015). The fact that symbols and narrative also shape the dynamics of the other types 
of retrospection should be equally clear. When a disaster is successfully framed as God’s 
punishment, governments can duck responsibility for both the adverse consequences of the 
disaster (blind retrospection) as well as any inadequate disaster policies (mediated 
retrospection). Many consider the Great Lisbon Earthquake in Portugal on 1 November 1755 
to be the point of turning away from perceiving disasters as a divine force and viewing them 
from a more naturalistic/scientific standpoint (Dynes, 2000). Even today, though, religious 
explanations in terms of a divine judgment appear to be persistent, particularly in developing 
countries (Chester and Duncan, 2010). Ergül, Gökalp, and Cangöz (2010) document how 
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Islamic newspapers in Turkey regularly adopt a religious frame of reference to explain many 
disasters triggered by natural hazards. This effectively disguises government 
mismanagement, which the authors claim is the principal agent in the loss of thousands of 
lives.  
 
Deficient symbolic acts could also exacerbate the electoral implications of poor disaster 
policies. Rather than being on the ground, shoulder to shoulder with the Louisiana governor 
and the people of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President George W. 
Bush was photographed peeking out of the window of Air Force One, hovering high above 
the destruction. In his autobiography, he referred to this image as one of his biggest mistakes 
and acknowledged that it came to embody the public’s critical perception of his disaster 
management efforts (Bush, 2010). Thus, there appears to be an important intermediate 
variable that relates to the prevailing discourses around disasters. Voters might be primarily 
intuitive at the ballot box and not assess critically the pros and cons of different government 
policies, but the voting decision will be strongly rooted in prevailing narratives. These 
narratives can also embody promises and expectations of reconstruction and recovery, factors 
usually associated with prospective voting, to the extent that they are linked to prevailing 
political disaster narratives. From this perspective, the causes and consequences of major 
disasters are not crystal clear to voters, not just because of bounded rationality, but also 
because they are communicated in a political arena where different myths, narratives, and 
symbols fight for dominance.  
 
This focus on narratives in retrospective voting theory is inspired by the positivistic and 
empirical branch of the narrative policy framework (NPF) (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones, 
McBeth, and Shanahan, 2014; Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth, 2018). NPF research 
understands a policy narrative as a story with some combination of a setting, characters 
(heroes, victims, and villains), plots, and a moral of the story (policy solution) (Jones and 
McBeth, 2010, p. 329). Disaster narratives, owing to their disruptive and critical impacts on 
people’s everyday lives, will often contain these elements in ample supply. The NPF 
literature provides useful guidance with regard to the typologies of different narratives and 
the preferred methods to capture and analyse policy narratives (Jones and McBeth, 2010; 
Jones, McBeth, and Shanahan, 2014). However, including narratives as a variable in 
retrospective voting theory diverges from the way in which they are employed in the NPF. 
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Rather than asking about the role of policy narratives in the policy process, retrospective 
voting theory queries the role of disaster narratives in influencing voter dynamics.  
 
Consequently, the differences between the approaches can be elucidated along two 
dimensions. First, retrospective voting theory seeks to explain voting behaviour. The 
dependent variable, therefore, is not policy processes, but electoral dynamics. Second, the 
independent variable of interest is political narratives shaped by disasters rather than policy 
narratives. Political narratives extend beyond policies. Political narratives moulded by 
disasters might include specific policy narratives, but their main impetus frequently will be 
related to the symbolic acts themselves as opposed to the actual policies implemented. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments of the paper is that political narratives of disasters could 
be constructed with little emphasis on policies.  
 
There are two methodological challenges to introducing this intermediate variable based on 
the dominant political narratives of the disaster. First, it is difficult to quantify the variable, as 
it relies on less tangible discourses and public perceptions than do variables based on 
concrete disaster impacts and government policies. However, triangulating qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of newspaper articles, social media feeds, graphical illustrations, 
transcripts from parliamentary debates, and national value surveys could help to establish the 
dominant political narrative that surrounds a disaster. Approaches based on this variable are 
well suited to mixed-methods research where both quantitative and qualitative data serve to 
inform the analysis (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Small-N comparative studies can be 
nested in larger quantitative studies as a means of triangulating findings and examining 
alternative models (Lieberman, 2005). These studies would make a fruitful contribution to the 
research field, until now dominated by large-N studies.  
 
Second, it appears difficult to separate out the effects of this intermediate variable from the 
other dynamics of retrospection. The challenge is that effective disaster policies (mediated 
retrospection) and favourable disaster narratives are highly correlated. Most politicians 
underpin disaster narratives in concrete disaster management policies, just as successful 
disaster policies help to constitute political narratives.  
  
Hitherto, two methodological approaches have been applied to separate out the effects of 
political symbols and narratives from those of disaster policies: one that exploits spatial 
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variations, and one that takes advantage of temporal variations. Lazarev et al. (2014)’s study 
of voting behaviour following the forest fires in Russia in summer 2010 separated out the two 
effects by analysing spatial differences in voting behaviour. The authors included the 
symbolic effect of government performance by using the proxy of President Vladimir Putin’s 
visits to some of the affected villages. Compared to his popularity in unburned villages, 
Putin’s popularity increased by about 15 percentage points (controlling for other factors) in 
the villages that he visited, despite them not having received any additional relief aid. 
Johnston and Goggin (2015) relied on temporal variation in their study of US voting 
behaviour after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that started in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 
2010. According to the study, voters’ confidence in the Obama administration was unaffected 
at first by the oil spill itself (blind retrospection). A reduction in public confidence in 
President Obama could be identified only after the media coverage went from descriptive 
journalism to a focus on accountability and blame. This led to the authors concluding that 
voters do not blindly attribute blame for a disaster; rather, media framing was the necessary 
intermediate variable translating the oil spill into actual voting behaviour (Johnston and 
Goggin, 2015, p. 468).  
 
This paper will be the first to apply explicitly a third methodological approach to show the 
importance of the intermediate variable of political narratives and symbols. The comparative 
research design below will look for variation in the independent variable itself: is the disaster 
tied to political discourses that frame it successfully as a government liability?  
 
Tsunami political discourse and electoral dynamics in Denmark and Sweden 
The literature investigating the linkage between disasters and voting behaviour has paid little 
attention to cases where major disasters do not really affect voting behaviour at all—Montjoy 
and Chervenak (2018) is a noticeable exception. Such an outcome defies blind and mediated 
retrospection, both of which hypothesise that major disasters influence voting behaviour. One 
explanation could be that other voting dynamics neutralise the effect of voter retrospection, 
resulting in an electoral impasse of modest voter movements (Montjoy and Chervenak, 
2018). Within retrospective theory, though, the lack of electoral consequences can be 
explained by the fact that disasters need to be framed as a political issue in order to have an 
electoral bearing. What is needed, therefore, is a research design where the political 
narratives can be clearly distinguished from mediated retrospection in the form of 
government policies.  
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The impact of the 2004 tsunami in Denmark and Sweden provides a unique opportunity to 
construct a most-similar research design that addresses the connection between political 
discourses and electoral consequences following a disaster triggered by a natural hazard. The 
most-similar comparison seeks to contrast cases that share most features to produce a quasi-
experimental design that neutralises some differences while highlighting others (Landman, 
2017). Denmark and Sweden are very similar along most socio-political dimensions: both 
countries are mature liberal democracies with vocal opposition parties and a free and critical 
media. In addition, they have multi-party political systems in which no single party is likely 
to hold an absolute majority; thus, the governing norm is a coalition government that does not 
face a vote of non-confidence in parliament. The two countries not only share many socio-
political characteristics, but also they displayed many likenesses when it came to the impact 
of the 2004 tsunami (blind retrospection) and critical public perceptions of policies related to 
the event (mediated retrospection). For instance, the tsunami was the deadliest natural 
disaster for more than 100 years in Denmark and Sweden. Owing to the many Scandinavian 
holidaymakers in Thailand, Sweden and Denmark lost 543 and 46 citizens, respectively, to 
the tsunami. By way of comparison, only 35 people in Sweden and 24 people in Denmark 
succumbed to natural disasters in the entire last century (CRED, 2017). Importantly for the 
present research design, the two countries did differ in terms of the political narrative that 
surrounded the disaster (the independent variable of interest) and how it affected the electoral 
dynamics (the dependent variable). 
 
The tsunami was the deadliest natural hazard for more than 100 years in both countries, yet 
the number of Swedish fatalities was still 10 times greater than the number of Danish 
fatalities (seven times controlling for population). One cannot rule out that this marked 
disparity of deaths by itself might explain differences in voting behaviour. That the Danish 
elections took place immediately after the tsunami, whereas the Swedish elections occurred 
more than one year later, is likely to counteract some of the electoral consequences of this 
variation. More significantly, the media outlets did not blame the governments for the high 
number of fatalities, but rather for the deficient evacuation plans and flawed information-
sharing.  
 
The 2004 tsunami case is unique in that it is related to political dynamics in Denmark and 
Sweden—countries far removed from the epicentre of the disaster—necessitating that disaster 
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responses can be separated analytically from ex ante disaster prevention policies. Nobody 
voiced the opinion that the Danish and Swedish governments should have set up warning 
systems in the Indian Ocean. The media abstained from criticising the two governments for 
the deaths themselves, concentrating instead on their inadequate evacuation policies, a lack of 
coordination, insufficient medical and organisational staffing on the ground, and poor 
information dissemination (see below). Any electoral movement, therefore, can be attributed 
purely to the public’s perception of the governments’ ex post disaster management efforts.
  
 
Following the recommendations of NPF theory, the political narratives of the tsunami rely 
primarily on meso-level content analysis of media reports and editorials (Jones, McBeth, and 
Shanahan, 2014; Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth, 2018). Media outlets have been singled out 
as a particularly useful source of narratives (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth, 2018, p. 340).  
 
Table 2 outlines some of the most important differences in political narratives between the 
two countries, distilled from a much more comprehensive comparative assessment of the 
Danish and Swedish responses to the tsunami based on media reports (Rubin, 2017). Most 
importantly, Table 2 reveals that the tsunami produced a powerful political narrative in 
Sweden but not in Denmark. In Sweden, the tsunami was turned into a political narrative 
around which different political actors positioned themselves: Prime Minister Göran Persson 
apologised, deflected blame, and visited the affected area; the independent evaluation report 
assigned clear political responsibility; and the opposition parties and the media were highly 
critical of the government, calling for the resignation of Persson. In Denmark, the criticism 
was mainly restricted to the bureaucratic mistakes made. Furthermore, the opposition never 
contested the government’s handling of the tsunami, the evaluation report was conducted in-
house, and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen did not apologise for any political faux 
pas or visit the disaster area. Instead, he effectively depoliticised the tsunami, delivering a 
statesman’s speech of hope and comfort in his New Year address to the nation, a political 
tradition in Denmark (but not in Sweden), which did not spark a single critical remark from 
the opposition parties. 
 
These different narratives resulted in very different electoral outcomes. In Denmark, Fogh 
Rasmussen was so confident that the government’s handling of the tsunami would not have 
adverse political consequences that he called for a general election just three weeks after the 
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tsunami—to be held on 8 February 2005. Despite the proximity of the election to the tsunami, 
the campaign themes never covered the inadequate government response to the event 
(Andersen et al., 2005). Instead, the focus was on major issues such as immigration and 
taxation reform, as well as minor matters such as an EUR 0.06 levy on Danish credit cards 
(Pedersen, 2005). For the first time in almost a century, the incumbent prime minister from 
the Liberal Party remained in office. This was in stark contrast to Sweden, where the adverse 
electoral implications of the Swedish narrative were evident: the incumbent government was 
ousted on 17 September 2006 after 12 years in power. Subsequently, the ousted ruling party 
commissioned an evaluation report to investigate what had gone wrong. The report concluded 
that the government’s handling of the tsunami and the ensuing critical debate had played a 
substantial role in the defeat (Social Democrats, 2006). This is supported by the quantitative 
study by Eriksson (2016), which identified a small but statistically significant negative 
impact of slightly less than one percentage point on the government’s vote share in tsunami-
affected municipalities after controlling for other factors. Furthermore, there is strong 
evidence that the unfavourable tsunami narrative stuck to Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds 
and contributed strongly to her resignation months before the general election in 2006 
(Sveriges Radio, 2006).  
 
Table 2. Key descriptors of political tsunami narratives in Denmark and Sweden 
 Denmark Sweden  
Government 
actions  
The prime minister did not visit the 
disaster area. 
The prime minister visited the disaster area. 
The prime minister did not (need to) 
deflect blame. 
The prime minister deflected blame by 
accusing the Thai authorities of not alerting 
him fast enough, and by singling out two 
particular civil servants in the foreign ministry 
for sitting on vital information for too long. 
The prime minister was never forced to 
apologise personally for the inadequate 
disaster management of the 
government. 
The prime minister had to issue a formal 
apology for the inadequate disaster 
management of the government. 
The official 
inquiries  
The tsunami evaluation report was 
conducted in-house by the foreign 
ministry. 
The tsunami evaluation report was conducted 
by an independent commission. 
The report did not assign any political 
responsibility. 
The report assigned political responsibility to 
the prime minister and the Foreign Minister 
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Upon publication, political parties from 
both sides of the aisle emphasised the 
need to look ahead. 
The report sparked massive critique from the 
media and opposition calling for the PMs 
resignation 
Political actors 
and the media  
The Royal Family refrained from any 
political comments.  
The King issued a badly concealed critique of 
the government in an interview following the 
tsunami: ‘in certain situations it is better to act 
than to do nothing. It is better to call an 
ambulance and then to send it back if it is not 
needed. But too often in Sweden nobody dares 
to take responsibility’ (Dagens Nyheter, 2005; 
author’s translation).  
There was a clear party truce between 
the government and the opposition. At a 
political rally after the tsunami, for 
example, all political leaders agreed not 
to engage in the usual political 
exchanges in the light of the tragedy. 
Opposition parties openly criticised the 
government, by claiming that it lacked 
competence, and that it did not comprehend 
that injured citizens needed to come home and 
be treated. They went as far as to argue that 
‘had Sweden had a centre-right government, 
fewer citizens would have died’ (Expressen, 
2005; author’s translation). 
 
No major media outlets called for the 
resignation of the prime minister. 
Many major media outlets called for the 
resignation of the prime minister. 
No individual ministers were subject to 
criticism or scrutiny. 
The foreign minister, in particular, was heavily 
criticised for incompetence and indifference. 
 
Source: author based on Dagens Nyheter (2005), Expressen (2005), and Rubin (2017). 
 
A quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles in Denmark and Sweden can aid 
triangulation of the previous findings and supply additional evidence of linkages between the 
tsunami and political narratives.2 A proxy of the extent to which the tsunami was part of a 
political narrative is provided by newspaper articles mentioning both the tsunami and the 
prime minister in the same piece. The actual content of these articles spans from neutral (such 
as an account of the prime minister participating in memorial ceremonies) to negative (such 
                                                 
2 Data on newspaper articles about the tsunami were extracted from two sources: Copenhagen Business School (2017) for 
the Danish data and BTJ (2017) for the Swedish data. Although the databases had different interfaces, the study strived for 
consistency in the search criteria. The more comprehensive Danish database did contain more newspaper articles but this 
was accounted for by expressing the number of articles in relative terms.  
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as highly critical opinion editorials and articles directly targeting the prime minister). No 
articles connecting the tsunami to the prime minister were approving of the government’s 
disaster management efforts, although a few opinion pieces did call for the ‘witch hunt’ to 
stop (HD, 2005). Even Persson’s visit to the tsunami-stricken areas of Thailand received 
negative coverage in the media (Aftonbladet, 2005). Hence, the vast majority of articles 
linking the prime minister to the tsunami are critical and unfavourable with respect to the 
government.  
 
Based on the preceding analysis, it is hypothesised first that the proportion of tsunami 
newspaper articles explicitly referring to the prime minister would be higher in Sweden than 
in Denmark (H1), supporting the finding that the tsunami is part of a political narrative in 
Sweden but not (or much less so) in Denmark. Consequently, it is hypothesised second that 
this dynamic will be magnified during election campaign periods where political positioning 
and struggles become even more salient (H2). Finally, it is hypothesised third that the 
publication of the highly critical independent evaluation report in Sweden would generate a 
spike in negative coverage associating the prime minister with the tsunami, and that one 
would not expect to see similar dynamics after the publication of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Denmark’s own evaluation report (H3). Table 3 summarises the main results of the 
analysis. 
 
Table 3. Newspaper articles on the Tsunami, Denmark and Sweden  
Description 
 




Total period H1 26 December 2004 
to 31 December 
2005 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘FOGH’ 
6 – 
Total period H1 26 December 2004 
to 31 December 
2005 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘PERSSON’ 
– 12 
Danish election campaign period H2 18 January 2005 to 
08 February 2005 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘FOGH’ 
8 – 
Comparable period before election 
campaign 
H2 26 December 2004 
to 17 January 2005 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘FOGH’ 
5 – 
Swedish election campaign period H2 1 January 2006 to 
17 September 2006 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘PERSSON’ 
– 29 
Comparable period after election 
campaign 
H3 18 September 2006 
to 31 December 
2006 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘PERSSON’ 
– 9 
A month after the release of the tsunami 
report in Sweden 
H3 1 December 2005 
to 31 December 
2005 




Comparable month of December in 
Denmark 
H3 1 December 2005 
to 31 December 
2005 
‘Tsunami*’ and  
‘FOGH’ 
5 – 
Comparable month after the release of 
the tsunami report in Denmark 
H3 23 May 2005 to 23 
June 2005 




Notes: percentages express the share of total tsunami articles in the period that contained the 
search terms.  
Source: author based on BTJ (2017) and Copenhagen Business School (2017).  
 
With regard to H1, it appears that twice as many tsunami articles in Sweden explicitly 
referred to the Swedish prime minister as compared to Danish newspaper articles referring to 
the Danish prime minister in the same period. This pattern is more pronounced in the election 
campaign periods. In the Danish case, there appears to be a slight increase in the number of 
tsunami articles that refer to the prime minister (from five to eight per cent). However, this 
slight rise is dwarfed by the Swedish statistics: 29 per cent of the tsunami articles in the 
Swedish election campaign period referred to the prime minister as compared to just 9 per 
cent in a comparable period.3 Finally, the publication of the Swedish evaluation report incited 
more critical articles linking the tsunami to the prime minister, thus supporting H3. The 
Swedish prime minister was more frequently connected to the tsunami as compared to his 
Danish counterpart: 26 and 4 per cent of tsunami articles in Swedish and Danish newspapers, 
respectively, mentioned the prime minister following the release of the evaluation report. The 
quantitative content analysis and confirmation of the three hypotheses yields further 
credence, therefore, concerning the argument of the two different narratives surrounding the 
2004 tsunami: a bureaucratic narrative in Denmark and a political narrative in Sweden.  
 
Conclusion 
Disasters triggered by natural hazards receive much public attention. The event that attracted 
the most readers of online news globally in a single day in 2017 was Hurricane Irma (The 
Economist, 2017). It superseded every other happening that year, including the inauguration 
of Donald Trump, various terrorist attacks, and the many political and celebrity scandals. 
                                                 
3 The differing lengths of the election periods in Denmark as compared to Sweden is due to the general election occurring 
every four years in Sweden (down to the day), whereas the prime minister in Denmark has the prerogative of calling the 
general election (within a four-year limit). This substantially lowers the duration of election campaigning in Denmark to 
around 20 days, which is the period between calling the election and the holding of it. 
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Hence, it is not surprising that empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that disasters do 
indeed impact on retrospective voting behaviour.  
 
The paper pointed up huge disparities, however, with regard to both the scope and the 
direction of the electoral consequences. Some studies document a decrease in the vote share 
of incumbent governments following a disaster, whereas others record an increase. While 
methodological differences might account for some of the variation, the paper makes the 
argument that an intermediate variable capturing the political discourses surrounding 
disasters might be useful in accounting for the diversity of electoral outcomes. The study of 
the disparity between Danish and Swedish political discourses pertaining to the 2004 tsunami 
and their electoral consequences lent credence to the merits of including the variable. The 
paper further posited that mixed methods would make a useful contribution to a research field 
that so far has been constituted primarily by large-N quantitative studies. Qualitative studies 
within a smaller subset of cases would provide more robust evidence of the actual mechanism 
through which disasters are translated into electoral outcomes. Mixed methods are also well 
equipped to research voter retrospection of disasters in developing countries or in non-
pluralist regimes. Triangulation of data and methods is generally recognised as a beneficial 
approach towards cases where statistical data are in short supply and access to reliable 
information is limited (Creswell and Clark, 2017).  
 
Improving understanding of the dynamics of voter retrospection in the wake of disasters is 
essential for policy. Both theoretically and empirically, there are grounds to prefer pluralistic 
political systems to authoritarian ones based on their instrumental effect on disaster 
mitigation. Most famously, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1999, 2009) has argued that 
democracies have eradicated the threat of famine. Although the conclusiveness of the 
statement has been contested (Devereux, 2007; Rubin, 2009), there is reason to believe that 
democracies contain safeguards that would effectively prevent major disasters akin to the 
famine in North Korea in the 1990s, which is estimated to have claimed the lives of 
approximately one million people (Haggard and Nolan, 2007). An independent and active 
opposition, a free media, and an informed electorate are integral components of such 
safeguards.  
 
Yet, there is a flipside to retrospective voting in pluralistic regimes: politicians appear to 
prefer responding to natural hazards to committing to more effective proactive policies of 
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prevention. None of the retrospective dynamics presented here are unequivocally a force for 
effective disaster management following disasters triggered by natural hazards. If blind 
retrospection is too prominent, it could undermine the government’s incentives for supplying 
humanitarian relief—why bother? If mediated voters are very myopic, the government’s 
incentives to act would depend crucially on the timing of the disaster vis-à-vis the election. If 
voters mainly register symbolic acts and political narratives, then politicians might place 
emphasis on empty rituals post disaster, rather than on the nuts and bolts of effective disaster 
management.  
 
The controversy surrounding Hurricane Maria, which struck Puerto Rico on 20 September 
2017, lends some credence to this statement. Although the Government of Puerto Rico, as 
well as independent reports, estimated the number of fatalities at slightly less than 3,000, 
President Trump has vehemently denied these calculations, instead referring to the disaster 
management as an ‘incredible, unsung success’ and ‘one of the best jobs that’s ever been 
done’ (BBC News, 2018; Milken Institute School of Public Health, The George Washington 
University, 2018). It would not be unreasonable to speculate that the analytical perspective of 
narrative retrospection will become even more salient in a political climate of ‘fake news’ 
where the echo chambers of politically-charged social media newsfeeds and discussions 
explicitly aim to convey narratives rather than facts.  
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